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Guillermo Maldonado L. * 
While it is true that some of the causes of the present 
situation in Latin America are of external origin and 
that there is little possibility that Latin America will be 
able to change them, it is no less true that, if the region 
is to grow it must determine what action its members 
are ready to take together in order to increase their 
independence. This article's main argument is that 
Latin America must strengthen its arrangements for 
regional co-operation and integration and make 
better use of its own resources; ideas, projects and 
processes have been set in motion for this purpose and 
must be given real political support. 
In addition, as an external reflection of what is 
being done within the region, negotiating power will 
have to be generated and wielded in the international 
arena in order to enable the region —and each of its 
countries— to participate on a more equitable basis in 
world trade and international negotiations, with a view 
to defending its legitimate interests. 
Within this frame of reference, certain questions 
arise in the light of the present crisis: in what way and 
at what cost will Latin America come through this 
crucial decade of the 1980s? What should be the 
strategies of its future development in a world in which 
the comparat ive and absolute advantages of in-
ternational t rade will undergo profound change? 
What is the role and what are the prospects of regional 
co-operation in this difficult transition? 
If correct answers are to be found for these and 
other questions, it will be necessary to monitor system-
atically the development of the international situa-
tion, to study the new technological trends which may 
emerge in the future development of the centres and 
their possible impact on the Latin American economy, 
to devise programmes to reduce the region's external 
vulnerability, to foster the processes of co-operation 
and integration among the Latin American countries, 
and to secure a unified Latin American position which 
will increase the region's negotiating power. 
•Director of the Division of International Trade and De-
velopment of ECL.AC. This article is a summary of documents 
prepared in the Division by the author and by Armando di 
Filippo, Eduardo Gana, Carlos Pérez del Castillo and Marian-
ne Schaper. 
The author of this article is convinced that a new 
international division of labour is becoming es-
tablished as a result of the big technological 
changes taking place in the main industrialized 
countries, changes which are reflected in their 
production structure, in their relations with each 
other and in the consolidation of a system of 
international economic relations based once 
again on the exercise of power rather than on 
co-operation. The uncertainty, state of crisis and 
instability of the international financial, mone-
tary and trade systems are also manifestations of 
the transition towards this division of labour and 
towards a system of international relations to sus-
tain it. Just as it is high-technology services and 
activities which provide the driving force for the 
changes within the centres, it is the unilateral 
exercise of power and bilateralism which is in-
creasingly replacing international co-operation 
and multilateralism in the relations among 
States. 
The most serious problem is without a doubt 
the region's indebtedness. In order to service its 
debt, Latin America has become locked into a 
continuous process of adjustment to new cir-
cumstances which has not only prevented any 
growth in the majority of the economies of the 
region, but has also produced a per capita decline 
to the levels of 10 or 20 years ago. 
In the 1980s Latin America has become a net 
exporter of capital to the developed world. A 
historical trend has thus been reversed, es-
sentially as a result of the exorbitant rates of 
interest payable on the foreign debt. The larger 
part of the surpluses of foreign currencies have 
been obtained by cutting back imports and not 
expanding exports. This development has also 
been affected by the protectionist policies and 
practices of the industrialized countries and by 
the rapid deterioration in the terms of trade. 
At the same time, at the end of the 1970s and 
the beginning of the 1980s, there was a vigorous 
return to democracy as a form of government 
and social order. This process has been hindered 
by the need to adopt austerity policies to service 
the foreign debt. The reduction of public ex-
penditure, the freezing of wages and the run-
away inflation have made the process of de-
mocratic consolidation more difficult, especially 
after the painful experience of life under au-
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thoritían régimes. These facts show how vulner-
able the region is and how limited each country's 
room for manoeuvre in devising and applying 
economic policies to re-established the former 
rate of economic and social growth and distribute 
its fruits equitably. Nevertheless, and despite the 
continuing state of crisis, the democratic process 
has shown enormous vigour and has received 
great popular and institutional support. 
Examination of the economic realities of 
Latin America and of political pronouncements 
and acts indicate that the situations confronting 
the countries of the region are difficult to bear. 
The countries are reaching the limits of social 
and political tolerance and a situation is emerg-
ing in which there could easily be an upsurge of 
violence, intolerance and polarization of posi-
tions. This atmosphere works against the 
application of policies designed to achieve 
economic growth on the basis of democratic con-
sensus. 
If Latin American is to resume its economic 
Five main arguments are analysed in this first 
section. First, that the system of international 
co-operation which emerged after the Second 
World War was a powerful factor in promoting 
and channeling the economic development of 
the capitalist world in the next twenty years. 
Second, that the activities of the economic co-
operation institutions controlled by the big de-
veloped capitalist nations —such as IMF, the 
World Bank and GAIT— helped to consolidate 
an international division of labour based on the 
relationship between the centre and the periph-
ery. Third, that this arrangement has been in a 
state of profound crisis since the 1970s when the 
long-term forces which imparted this dynamism 
became exhausted and the world economy grew 
increasingly sluggish and umbalanced. Four, 
that the present interregnum necessarily entails a 
deterioration in the institutional superstructure 
and social development, it must secure, at least, a 
steady increase in exports; this means that the 
protectionist policies and practices of the in-
dustrialized countries which are affecting the 
region must be halted or moderated: the in-
dustrialized countries must accept a deficit in 
their trade with the Latin American nations. 
However, it is important to move away from the 
present ridiculous situation in which the region 
exports capital, and return to the situation in 
which Latin America receives a net inflow of 
financing. If this objective is to be attained, there 
will have to be more order in the macroeconomic 
policies of the industrialized countries respon-
sible for the high interest rates and growth of 
protectionism. 
The democratic process will also have to be 
consolidated: democracy must not be limited to 
the electoral process but must provide the legal, 
institutional and social framework within which 
the inequities which remain a feature of Latin 
American development can be eliminated. 
I 
of international co-operation and negotiation. 
And five, that a technological revolution has be-
gun to grow and spread in the centres which will 
fundamentally change the international divison 
of labour and, consequently, the structure of the 
centre-periphery system. 
1. The organization of the international economic 
order and its effect on the periphery 
The system of international relations which 
emerged from the Second World War produced 
a wide network of political and economic in-
stitutions of a multilateral nature designed to 
direct and control the understanding among 
States. Never before in history had it been pos-
sible to construct such a universal and complex 
system of international bodies. 
In this system some bodies play vital roles in 
The crisis in the international economic orders 
and its implications for Latin America 
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the Financial, monetary and trade operations of 
the developed world; for example, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The 
economic power of the big industrial centres is 
expressed through these institutions, and their 
functioning is affected both by the struggle 
among those Powers and by the way in which 
they exert their influence on the developing re-
gions of the world. 
In the promotion of development the assis-
tance furnished by the World Bank usually took 
the form of tied loans, which helped the periph-
ery to acquire basic infrastructure, but which 
were used for the purchase of goods and services 
supplied by the private companies of the central 
countries. Something like this happened in the 
case of several institutions, such as the Inter-
A m e r i c a n Deve lopment Bank and the In-
ternational Development Agency, to name two 
institutions of special importance for the Latin 
American economies. The failure to establish 
preferential treatment for the Latin American 
suppliers of capital goods encouraged the mas-
sive acquisition of equipment from the centres. 
Development assistance was thus an ambivalent 
factor. On the one hand, it limited the in-
dependen t technological development of the 
peripheral regions, thus impeding the proper 
expansion of their capital goods industries. On 
the o ther hand, it provided the essential in-
frastructure for Latin American development. 
In the trade sphere, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade worked to establish uni-
form and equal treatment in tariff matters on 
the part of every country in its relations with all 
other countries. Its rules were based on man-
ufactures where the comparative advantages 
were on the side of the centres, and they did not 
deal with primary commodities, where the com-
parative advantages were with the periphery. 
Under the influence of the GATT rules the 
tariffs on trade in manufactures grew more liber-
al, but the centres granted high subsidies and 
strong protection to their domestic agriculture. 
In the 1960s —owing to the influence of the 
UNCTAD generalized system of preferences— 
part iv was added to GATT, providing for the 
possibility of preferential treatment for the de-
veloping countries. 
From the end of the Second World War up to 
the present time, as several EGLAC studies antic-
ipated, the elasticity (prices and incomes) of the 
demand for manufactures in relation to the 
corresponding elasticity in the demand for prima-
ry commodities led to a systematic increase in 
the share of manufactures in the value of world 
trade. As the developing countries were export-
ers of primary commodities and importers of 
manufactured goods, their trade balances show-
ed chronic deficits, with consequent indebted-
ness. 
As a result of these basic imbalances, the 
world economic system and trade in particular 
—based on the principle of liberalization— did 
not bring about balanced and stable develop-
ment but instead encouraged tendencies towards 
structural imbalance and inequitable distribu-
tion of the fruits of trade. Thus the need for 
co-operation proclaimed by UNCTAD on the basis 
of the ECLAC ideas. 
In the monetary and financial sphere, these 
imbalances were controlled cyclically by the 
application of restrictive measures suggested to 
the deficit and debtor countries by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund as a means of adjust-
ing their external balances. Accordingly, the 
restriction of imports as part of the adjustments 
made necessary by the external imbalance had a 
negative influence on levels of activity and de-
velopment prospects in the countries which de-
pended on manufactures acquired from the cen-
tres. The strategy of industrialization by import 
substitution attempted by the majority of the 
large and medium-sized countries of Latin 
America was designed to produce self-centred 
deve lopment 1 which would reduce the vul-
nerability of the regional production structure to 
the fluctuations of international trade. This poli-
cy could not always be reconciled with the trade 
and financial openness advocated by GATT and 
the Bretton Woods institutions. 
'Development tending to strengthen and diversify 
domestic production on the basis of national and regional 
demand. However, the Latin American production of capital 
goods was not included in the application of protectionist 
measures. In order to reduce the costs of industrial in-
vestments, imports of production equipment were freed 
from all restrictions and subsidized in many different ways. 
These policies did not foster the independence of regional 
development. 
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The liberalization of trade between the cen-
tres —after the reconstruction of Europe and 
Japan with United States help— was an efficient 
tool which boosted their economies and strength-
ened their mutual interdependence J>ut left 
the periphery in an unfavourable competitive 
position. 
The economic events of the 1970s brought 
out more clearly the bias and shortcomings in the 
functioning of some of the institutions es-
tablished in the postwar period. The official de-
velopment assistance furnished by the World 
Bank, IDB and other intergovernmental organs 
declined in relative importance as financial 
privatization and transnationalization increased 
in the 1970s. The GATT rules and regulations are 
increasingly broken by the new forms of trade 
controls stemming from the need of the centres 
to protect their domestic levels of activity and 
employment. Similarly, the financial and trade 
difficulties of a more sluggish and less balanced 
world economy have changed the liquidity and 
balance-of-payments situations, lessening the 
usefulness and effectiveness of IMF, particularly 
in the management of the foreign debt. These 
problems damage international relations be-
tween centre and periphery. 
2. The North-South negotiations in the framework 
of international co-operation 
The structural imbalances in the North-South 
relationship call for a new international econom-
ic order and reform of the institutional super-
structure. Today more than ever before this new 
order advocated by the United Nations since the 
early 1970s is an essential condition for restoring 
harmonious development in the world economy 
and mitigating to some extent the dangerous 
consequences of world economic restructuring 
brought about by technological change. 
However, the adoption by the United Na-
tions General Assembly (on 1 May 1974) of the 
Declaration and Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order has been followed by more than 10 years 
of debate, consultations and negotiations among 
developed and developing countries in a multi-
tude of forums both within and outside the 
United Nations system, with very discouraging 
results. 
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The objective of the developing countries, 
which became the central topic of the so-called 
North-South dialogue, was the establishment of a 
new and more equi table in te rna t iona l 
framework of relations which would give them a 
greater say and more decision-making power in 
three closely interrelated areas: primary com-
modities, trade and monetary and financial mat-
ters. 
The main aim for primary commodities is to 
achieve better conditions of access to the markets 
of the developed countries, greater participation 
by producers in marketing, distribution and 
transport systems, and an increase in the in-
dustrial processing of raw materials in the pro-
ducer countries themselves. All these topics are 
still under study and no concrete measures have 
yet been adopted. 
In the trade sector the developing countries 
wish to check and reverse the protectionist trends 
and make progress towards the liberalization of 
international trade. They are seeking to establish 
a set of rules and principles which will bring 
about ajuster and more equitable trade system. 
In the financial and monetary area the inten-
tion of the developing countries is to devise a new 
international monetary system which will meet 
their needs and give them a greater say in de-
cisions affecting their interests. Faced with the 
increasing and serious shortage of financial 
flows, they are seeking an expansion of the re-
sources available to the developing countries. 
These resources would come from international 
financial institutions by means of additional 
allocations of special drawing rights, an increase 
in IMF quotas and expansion of the compensatory 
financing service. None of these proposals has so 
far been accepted nor has any progress been 
made on the initiatives for reform of the in-
ternational monetary system. 
Although the developed countries approved 
the resolution on the establishment of a new in-
ternational economic order, out of a desire to 
reach agreements which would bring some order 
to the energy products markets through price 
adjustments in the mid-1970s, they fell back in 
defense of the prevailing system, which they 
found a useful means of protecting their more 
immediate interests. Throughout the negotiat-
ing progress they maintained a sceptical attitude 
as to the competence of the United Nations 
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forums, advocating the full validity of the special-
ized forums such as GATT and IMF, in which they 
held advantages in relative power or voting 
rights. This helped to weaken the general 
framework of negotiation and no major agree-
ments were reached for the transformation of 
the system of international economic relations. 
3. The dynamics of the international economic 
system and its consequences for Latin America 
The accelerated growth of the world economy in 
the first decades after the war was due to the 
great dynamism of the industrial centres. This 
dynamism began to fade in the 1970s, yielding to 
the pressures of stagnation and deflation which 
became more acute at the end of the decade. 
Throughout this process the non-convertibility 
of the dollar, which came into effect in 1971, was 
an important innovation which highlighted the 
preponderance of a single country in the world 
monetary system. 
The effects of this slowdown were not felt 
immediately in Latin America, partly because the 
financial freedom of the 1970s allowed the Latin 
American economies to continue to grow beyond 
the limits imposed by the purchasing power of 
their exports. In other words, the weaker locomo-
tive power of the centres was offset to a large 
extent by abundant private financing of a trans-
national nature. The open trade policy of the 
United States from about 1975 also seems to have 
been a factor which stimulated imports to a level 
higher than the corresponding level of domestic 
economic activity. 
The decline in the economic dynamism of 
the centres has profound structural causes 
—associated in part with the exhaustion of the 
postwar technological cycle— which have 
slowed down the rate of accumulation. The im-
balance in the composition of global demand 
—excessive consumption and insufficient in-
vestment— together with energy and ecological 
restrictions on the supply side, helped to create 
the troubling conditions of "stagflation" which 
was a feature of the 1970s. It is a familiar story 
that, in order to overcome this situation, the 
United States applied a combination of mone-
tarist and supply-side policies using the reduc-
tion of the money supply as its tool; it also went to 
the private financial market to fund its fiscal def-
icit and reduce the tax burden on the private 
sector in order to stimulate investment and con-
sumption. 
This policy resulted in a great reduction in 
inflationary pressures and a sharp domestic 
recession which increased the levels of un-
employment and idle capacity. Although 
economic activity in the United States made a 
vigorous recovery, investment —a fundamental 
long-term factor— has not grown at the expected 
rate, especially with respect to its more pro-
ductive components. 
The monetarist and supply-side strategy re-
duced the share of wage earners in the global 
product —a consequence of the higher rate of 
unemployment and the loss of negotiating power 
by wage earners— and the return on financial 
capital increased considerably. Producer 
businesses experienced a reduction of their wage 
costs but a relative increase in their financial 
costs; this impeded accumulation for productive 
purposes by private business. 
The high real interest rates in the United 
States spread —although at lower levels— to the 
rest of the developed central economies. In order 
to avoid domestic inflation or uncontrollable 
fluctuations in their exchange rates, Europe and 
Japan had to bear the recessionary effects of the 
monetarist and supply-side strategy of the 
United States. Thus, the "stagflation" which 
emerged in the 1970s is being combatted with 
policies which have not yet proved their medium 
and long-term effectiveness as means of restor-
ing the economic growth rates of the centres. 
The recession in the centres has had a de-
vastating impact on the Latin American econ-
omy. The decline in living standards and in-
crease in idle capacity, sometimes with the 
abandonment of production by failed businesses, 
and in unemployment, with all its social and polit-
ical effects, are some of the most important re-
sults. 
During the 10 years immediately preceding 
the crisis the patterns of Latin America's involve-
ment in the world economy had undergone a 
profound transformation. The processes of in-
ternationalization and establishment of financial 
links with the industrialized market-economy 
countries had grown stronger, accentuating the 
vulnerability of the region to external fluctua-
tions (ECLAC, 1983 and 1984). 
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The large external debt and the burden of 
servicing it are one of the serious problems 
reflecting the external stranglehold on the re-
gion's economy. Study of this situation illustrates 
the limited capacity of the region, internally and 
externally, to take independent decisions 
on more suitable policies. 
The net amount of external investments and 
loans has been lower than net remittances of 
interest and profits. For this reason, in 1984 
—for the third consecutive year— Latin America 
had to make a sizeable net transfer of resources 
to the rest of the world. This transfer was in the 
order of US$ 26 700 million which, although 
lower than the US$ 30 000 million for 1983, sig-
nified, for the region's import capacity, a reduc-
tion of approximately 24% in the value of ex-
ports of goods and services. 
The structural aspects and the inadequate 
domestic economic strategies and policies were 
important, but it was the external factors which 
lay at the root of the Latin American crisis and 
determined its scale. In the majority of the 
countries of Latin America these factors evolved 
in similar conditions and with common features. 
4. Prospects for the world economy and the 
consequences for Latin America 
The phenomenon of "stagflation" in the 1970s 
has been interpreted as an excess of effective 
demand accompanied by an inadequate rate of 
productive accumulation rather than as a lack of 
effective demand in the strictly Keynesian sense 
(Prebisch, 1984). The increasing share of gov-
ernment expenditure and wages —public and 
private— in the national income reduced the 
amount of the private reinvestable surplus and 
gave rise to a distribution struggle in the con-
sumption sphere which affected investment in 
two ways: firstly, in consumerist attitudes in the 
use of the surplus which slowed the investment 
rate; and secondly, in the internal composition of 
this investment, both public (defence, space pro-
gramme) and private (designed to improve the 
forms of consumption rather than to increase 
labour productivity and employment). Of 
course, the monetary and energy crises of the 
1970s also played a part in creating problems of 
inflation and slowing down investment. 
As has already been pointed out, the mone-
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tarist and supply-side policy applied in the 
United States from the 1980s succeeded in 
controlling "stagflation" and after the initial 
recession (1981-1982) produced a recovery 
(1983-1984). But this strategy is based on 
macroeconomic imbalances which are difficult to 
sustain over the medium and long term: fiscal 
deficit, trade deficit, and rates of open un-
employment above the historic postwar rates. 
Future modification of this policy depends to a 
large degree on the decisions taken by the 
economic authorities of the industrialized world 
and the international co-operation institutes un-
der the control of the central countries. This 
circumstance invests any assessment of the short 
and medium-term prospects for Latin America 
with a considerable degree of uncertainty. The 
international situation has become so fluid that 
the terms of the problem are changing from one 
day to the next. 
In these circumstances the Latin American 
countries must adopt a regional strategy based 
on increased co-operation and harmonization in 
the international promotion of their common 
interests rather than on bilateral arrangements 
and vertical relationships. 
Perhaps any future concession by the in-
dustrialized centres of trade and financial terms 
more favourable to the region will result not so 
much from the representations of each in-
dividual Latin American economy or greater bi-
lateral co-operation, as from a common, firm and 
united attitude in defence of shared interests. 
This proposal is all the more valid in the present 
financial international situation. 
After the period of transition, which will per-
haps take what remains of the 1980s, the centres 
will step up their development on the basis of the 
new technologies and energy sources which they 
are now preparing at top speed. The technological 
revolution in microelectronics, biotechnology 
and the use of more diversified sources of energy 
will generate economic structures which will 
transform not only the societies of the centres but 
also the international character and distribution 
of the world's productive capacity. It is difficult to 
foresee what impact this process will have on the 
place of Latin America in the world order, but 
there is no doubt that it will have profound social 
and economic effects. 
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5. Some possible action for Latin America 
The present crisis might bring about a reaction 
on the part of Latin America which would have 
certain features which must be described. The 
external restrictions and the shortage of foreign 
currency is forcing governments to impose 
tighter regulation of the region's import capacity 
and compelling the State to take a more active 
part in the control and administration of foreign 
trade. With a view to solving the problem of 
unemployment and correcting the shortcomings 
in the region's production capacity, attention 
might be given to strengthening those forms, 
institutions and mechanisms of planning which 
are compatible with the operation of the market. 
The reduced import capacity will perhaps stimu-
late industrial activity to replace from Latin 
American sources an influx of imports which is 
now no longer available. The need to replace 
with domestic savings the interrupted flows of 
external financing might encourage tax reforms 
to penalize luxury consumption and reward the 
accumulation of capital. Perhaps a more austere 
and equitable attitude in the areas of consump-
tion will be balanced by a more dynamic and 
responsible attitude to accumulation. National 
capital might possibly be repatriated, while the 
various forms of speculation and corruption 
—especially in the financial sector— could be 
combatted with greater vigour. 
If these hypotheses as to the Latin American 
response to the crisis are found to make sense, a 
strategy would be established for greater recourse 
to State intervention2 and planning in economic 
life; the national market would be protected and 
productive domestic activities promoted; region-
al trade would be set up on new bases which are 
already being explored; and more equitable 
trends would be encouraged in the distribution 
of income and consumption, with a view to pro-
moting accumulation based on domestic savings. 
This picture would be compatible with the con-
2This should not be confused with an inflated 
bureaucracy or excessive growth in an inefficient public 
sector. 
tinuation of the democratic régimes which have 
recently come to power in the region. 
Self-centred development, the search for 
efficient and democratic planning, diversifica-
tion of production and industrialization, region-
al co-operation and integration, as well as the 
promotion of more dynamic and equitable 
growth, constitute a turnaround in ECLAC'S think-
ing. But the region is not the same as it was in the 
early postwar years. Today the societies and the 
economies of Latin America are much more de-
veloped and interdependent; they have a degree 
of real and formal integration which did not exist 
before; their average level of education is much 
higher, and they have highly trained teams of 
scientists, technicians and professionals. Lastly, 
they also have an increasing potential for joint 
defence of their common interest in the in-
ternational, political and economic spheres. 
The urgent need to reactivate the national 
and regional production of Latin America and to 
retool its industry with a view to long-term ex-
pansion means that there will have to be a 
pragmatic review of foreign policy and of in-
ternational negotiations. In view of the emergen-
cy situation caused by the present shortage of 
foreign exchange, it is legitimate to use measures 
of protection and barter trade to maintain levels 
of activity and employment, facilitate the retool-
ing of production units and, in general, promote 
the accumulation of capital. 
The counterpart of these tactics and strate-
gies of negotiation with the governments and 
businesses of the centres is to be found in the 
process of Latin American co-operation and in-
tegration. The unity of the countries of Latin 
America has an external expression in the 
strengthening of their power to negotiate with 
the centres and an internal expression in the 
greater integration of their economies. 
The search for self-centred development 
which will help to solve the basic problems of 
Latin American societies would seem to require, 
in the long term, a new ethics of development 
which will neutralize divisive outside interven-
tion and harness the enormous possibilities of 
technical progress which are at hand. The new 
technology must be sifted and adapted for use in 
accordance with the objectives of self-centred 
development. 
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II 
Latin America's foreign trade: 
diagnosis, prospects and policies 
1. Characteristics of Latin American 
trade and impact of the crisis 
The restrictions imposed on regional develop-
ment by the international environment man-
ifested themselves, where trade was concerned, 
in the spectacular fall in the prices of primary 
commodities,3 a fall which was all the more 
serious as these commodities accounted for 
80% of all Latin American exports. On the 
other hand, there was no change in the tradition-
al dependence on imports of manufactures, 
mainly intermediate and capital goods, which at 
the beginning of the 1980s still made up 60% 
of the region's total imports. It is thus easy to 
appreciate the great importance of external 
purchasing power for this essential supply and 
the persistent structural imbalance in the 
relationship of the Latin American countries 
with the exterior. 
In the trade sphere the recovery of the cen-
tral economy would not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the real export earnings of the de-
veloping countries, particularly the countries of 
Latin America. The present protectionist trends 
—features of the trade controls which are on the 
increase in the centres— might have a harmful 
effect both on the volumes and on the prices of 
the goods exported by Latin America. 
Although the region has benefitted from the 
United States recovery in 1983-1984 and from 
the overvaluation of the dollar, which have facili-
tated a great expansion of their exports to the 
United States, for reasons which have already 
been mentioned it remains to be seen whether 
the recovery of the centres will continue. 
On the other hand, when the dollar returns 
to a more reasonable value competition from the 
United States economy will be felt in the markets 
3The composite index for the 24 main export com-
modities of Latin America (excluding oil) fell by 25% 
between 1980 and the beginning of 1985. 
of Europe and Japan, regions in which produc-
tion is also undergoing changes with the in-
troduction of new forms of technology. It must 
therefore be assumed that in this stage of tech-
nological transition, with the consequent 
restructuring of comparative advantages in the 
international order, all the central economies will 
proceed to protect their national markets, This 
action might extend to control of the levels of 
activity and the employment situation, and con-
tinue until the new structure of comparative 
advantages in the developed world become 
clearer. 
2. The protectionism of the centres 
In recent years protectionism has been a domi-
nant feature of the trade policy of the industrial 
nations. In putting protectionism into practice 
they have made use of a whole series of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in their markets which are 
damaging Latin American production and ex-
ports. 
One of the negative aspects of tariff barriers 
is the graduation of tariffs which, by taking into 
account the degree of processing of the products 
concerned, has become a powerful obstacle to the 
region's industrialization. The non-tariff barri-
ers include import quotas, variable surcharges, 
safeguard clauses, "voluntary" export restric-
tions, discriminatory practices, compensatory 
rights, technical trade barriers and production 
and export subsidies. Protectionism has also 
grown in other forms. One example is the shar-
ing agreements which the countries of the region 
have had to accept as the only means of exporting 
to a developed nation, as happened in the case of 
the GATT Multifibre Agreement. To appreciate 
the importance of these measures, it is sufficient 
to recall that in recent years approximately one 
half of the region's exports —excluding oil— to 
the United States, the European Community and 
Japan were affected by them. In practical terms, 
these protectionist measures are producing a 
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situation in which the industrialized countries 
have the capacity to "administer" their trade with 
the developing countries. 
This new protectionism has developed at the 
margin of the rules and obligations of the in-
ternational trade system based on the GATT reg-
ulations. As protectionism for the most part in-
volves bilateral arrangements, it represents a 
steady retreat from multilateralism as a means of 
solving the increasing economic and trade prob-
lems. In turn —as a result of the threat of pro-
tectionism— investment in export-oriented 
activities has declined in many countries of the 
region, especially with respect to manufactured 
goods4. 
Although it is difficult to assess the full extent 
of the effect of this increased protectionism, it 
might prove to be one of the main problems 
affecting international economic relations and 
hindering the recovery of the world economy. 
3. Latin American trade prospects 
The prospects for a sustained expansion of Latin 
American trade up to the end of this decade 
depends on a number of factors, including the 
following: 
i) The world economic recovery. This will be de-
termined by the macroeconomic policies of the 
industrialized countries, especially the United 
States, owing to the controlling role of their 
economies in the international financial and 
monetary system. 
ii) The behaviour ofprimary commodities. Owing 
to the dependence of Latin America on exports 
ofprimary commodities —and the close relation-
ship between price movements and de-
velopments in world economic activity— there 
can be no great hope of a recovery of the 
economies of the region based on exports of raw 
materials. Some forecasts suggest that the aver-
age annual increase in the real value of world 
exports of primary commodities will be in the 
4
 A concrete example of this trend is the law approved on 
31 July 1985 by the Congress and President of the United 
States under which the United States, to protect its own 
industry, will vote in the international financing in-
stitutions against any loan for projects for the mining, 
smelting and refining of copper. 
order of 2 to 3% in the period 1985-1995 (ECLAC, 
1985). Over the same period the real rate of 
growth in manufactures is estimated at 12%. If 
this proves to be the case, the region's terms of 
trade will suffer yet another major setback. 
iii) The protectionist trends. There is little pros-
pect of preventing an upswing of protectionism 
in the industrialized countries, despite the 
numerous undertakings which these countries 
have given in recent years. Owing to a number of 
factors of a structural nature, it is not thought 
that the protected industries of the developed 
countries will regain their international com-
petitiveness; this might lead to the adoption of 
additional restrictive measures for those sectors. 
If that happens, the region's capacity to service its 
debt and finance higher levels of imports by 
means of increased export earnings would be 
even more seriously affected. 
iv) Adjustment policies. If the present reces-
sionary processes remain unchanged, some 
countries of the region will find themselves in 
situations difficult to control from the social as 
well as the economic standpoint. The possibility 
of expansion in the future will depend to a large 
extent on the external conditions which de-
termine Latin America's trade expansion, such 
as: the world economic recovery, the in-
ternational prices for the main Latin American 
exports, the net amount of external financing 
and the level of international interest rates. 
v) International negotiations. Broadly speak-
ing, the prospects for and results of future in-
ternational negotiations will depend on the 
negotiating capacity of the developing countries, 
something which rests to a large extent in their 
own hands. The first step is to strengthen co-
operation and solidarity among these countries. 
Moreover, there is an obvious need to review the 
objectives, procedures and strategies of future 
negotiations with the industrialized countries, so 
that the dialogue will be more effective and not 
cause the same frustrations as in the past. 
4. Negotiating policies and options in 
the area of trade 
The first lesson of the North-South dialogue is 
that trade, financial and monetary matters have 
been discussed and negotiated by each country in 
isolation and in different forums. In the case of 
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primary commodities the focus has always been 
on individual product negotiations. In the GATT 
multilateral talks the negotiation has been 
broken down into groups and subgroups either 
of specific products or of specific barriers. Thus, 
there has never been a comprehensive or in-
tegrated focus for negotiations on the trade prob-
lem. The cost of this defect has been very high 
for the developing countries, for it impedes the 
process of co-ordination and joint action, makes 
it easier for the industrialized countries to create 
division and disagreement and neutralizes the 
negotiating power of the developing countries. 
Latin America should conduct the negotia-
tions with the industrialized countries in a much 
broader forum which would include primary 
commodities, manufactures, capital goods, ser-
vices, technology, investments, and monetary 
and financial matters, as well as the region's 
purchasing power, which has never been given 
any importance at a negotiating table. The strug-
gle to increase the negotiating power of the re-
gion will not be based on a desire for confrontation 
but rather on the intention to safeguard the re-
gion's legitimate interests. 
If there is to be a new, more equitable and 
dynamic international trade system, the follow-
ing objectives will have to be taken into con-
sideration: 
i) Structural adjustment policies must be 
viewed as a new dimension of the future 
trade system. The theory that such adjust-
ment would be produced spontaneously 
through the free play of market forces has 
proved incorrect. 
ii) A satisfactory system of safeguards will have 
to be established in order to solve, in a clear, 
consistent, equitable and non-discriminatory 
manner, the problems and difficulties which 
will inevitably arise. 
Hi) Attention should be given to the method of 
handling the processes which fall outside the 
GATT regulations and obligations or which 
are not dealt with adequately by the present 
trade system. 
iv) It will be necessary to secure the active 
participation of all countries and interaction 
among the various subsystems. 
v) A strong link must be established between 
trade and development and this link must 
be incorporated in the generalized system of 
preferences without introducing new con-
cepts such as graduation and reciprocity. 
vi) The trade system must begin to function 
again on a stable basis. This requires new 
initiatives in the areas of employment, 
monetary stability and the transfer of re-
sources to the developing countries. 
These objectives will be achieved only by the 
united will of the various groups of countries. 
One fact which must be stressed in future nego-
tiations is that the present order has not only 
ceased to function for the developing countries 
but has also ceased to suit the developed coun-
tries themselves. 
It must also be stressed that widespread pro-
tectionism has been one of the decisive causes of 
the erosion of the fundamental principles of the 
international trade system. Given this situation, 
two kinds of measure might be agreed at a re-
gional level: preventive measures to prevent the 
opening of any debate detrimental to the region's 
exports; and the possible adoption of new mea-
sures. This will require a detailed knowledge of 
the legislation and regulations in force in the 
industrialized countries and of the pressure 
groups which might act for or against Latin 
American exports; it will also require retaliation 
against protectionism, with the application of 
similar measures against exports of the de-
veloped countries to the region. Such action 
might also have a preventive effect, since in-
dustrialized countries considering the adoption 
of protectionist measures would study the im-
plications of retaliation very carefully. Further-
more, this kind of equal treatment would elevate 
the negotiations to a more political level where 
the regional mechanisms for agreement and co-
ordination would have to be strengthened. 
The most important contribution that Latin 
America could make to the world recovery would 
be to continue to fight for greater recognition of 
the increasing importance of the developing 
countries in the functioning of the world econ-
omy and of the need for an integrated 
approach—covering monetary, trade and finan-
cial matters— in international action to correct 
the shortcomings of the present world trade 
system. 
Analysis of the debt situation illustrates the 
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interdependence between developing and de- second place to the main goal of facilitating Latin 
veloped countries. It also confirms the close rela- American growth. At the same time, theconclu-
tionships between the monetary, Financial and sion of agreements for this purpose would enable 
trade systems. In any common formula for debt the region to increase the volume of its imports 
service, agreements on the extension of time- from the industrialized countries, which would 
limits and reduction of interest rates must take assist the recovery of the world economy. 
Ill 
Regional integration and co-operation 
1. General background 
Faced with a pressing need to increase and di-
versify intraregional trade and step up in-
dustrialization, the Latin American countries de-
vised systems of integration. Starting from very 
low levels, trade within the region has grown very 
rapidly as a result of the liberalization of trade, 
export promotion programmes and the in-
troduction of other instruments of integration, 
including payment systems. In addition to grow-
ing, trade has changed its composition. The ad-
vance of industrialization has made it increasing-
ly possible to incorporate intermediate goods 
and certain capital goods. 
Nevertheless, the participants did not all ben-
efit equally from this process. Some countries 
accumulated deficits in their trade with the re-
gion on top of their deficits in international 
trade; others saw their national industries 
threatened by the tariff reductions inherent in 
the process of integration. 
For these and other reasons some Latin 
American countries became increasingly reluc-
tant to continue to reduce tariffs and derestrict 
their imports from the region, and although the 
time-limits for compliance with the agreements 
were extended and increasing numbers of ex-
ceptions were permitted, the integration systems 
could not attain all their goals. In the 1970s the 
negotiations not only marked time but even gave 
clear signs of moving backwards. When the 
economic crisis burst on Latin America, several 
countries began to apply a number of non-tariff 
restrictions which further eroded the agreed 
preferences. 
All this seems to indicate that general, multi-
lateral and automatic removal of tariffs is not of 
itself a sufficient response to the needs of the 
countries and the genuine diversity of the region. 
Owing to the different levels of development of 
productive structures and the different degrees 
of openness to the exterior, the costs of integra-
tion are perceived more clearly than the benefits. 
The latter seem more uncertain and distant. 
This means that in the present economic cir-
cumstances the Latin American countries are 
willing to grant each other tariff preferences only 
at reduced levels, or for specific items, or for 
some members and not for others. These con-
cessions are often granted only for limited pe-
riods or are made subject to quotas. 
Furthermore, the results of industrial in-
tegration have so far been meagre, although this 
does not invalidate the considerable power of this 
tool as a means of avoiding costly duplication of 
certain investments, exploiting the advantages of 
specialization and distributing the benefits equi-
tably. 
Lastly, it must be stressed that the systems of 
payment and reciprocal credit were the in-
struments which functioned most effectively in 
the past. They produced a considerable saving of 
foreign exchange, since it was necessary to use 
convertible currency only to settle the trade bal-
ances. The systems were easy to administer and 
the costs were very small in comparison with the 
great benefits obtained. 
The economic crisis in the region also caused 
the payment systems to collapse. Convertible cur-
rency became scarce, since almost all the coun-
tries had to bear the heavy burden of servicing 
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their external debt at a time when external 
borrowing as a source of financing had dis-
appeared. Some Latin American countries could 
not pay off the balances of their debt, while oth-
ers began to exclude certain exports from the 
payment systems. The countries of the region are 
now seeking possible ways of reactivating these 
mechanisms which have proved to be a valuable 
means of increasing intraregional trade. 
2. The need to upgrade the integration systems 
It is essential to re-establish the direction and 
reconstitute the elements of the integration sys-
tems of Latin America. The region's external 
structural dependence and vulnerability au-
thenticate the need to lay the foundations for 
more dynamic, solid, equitable and independent 
economic and social development. 
Despite the obstacles to integration and the 
errors which may have been committed in using 
some of the instruments, these methods still offer 
the region an opportunity to set in motion 
economic growth based on their own potential 
and strengthen the links among the countries to 
enable the nations of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, acting together, to solve the problems 
of their inequitable role in the international econ-
omy and strengthen their negotiating power with 
the rest of the world. 
Within this framework one of the specific 
tasks which the integration systems will have to 
tackle is the re-establishment of the levels of in-
traregional trade, which have declined as a result 
of the crisis. This will require utilization of idle 
resources and an increase of the imports which 
the region needs in order to resume its develop-
ment. This purpose will be served by improving 
the mechanism of compensatory payments and 
reciprocal credit, as this will produce an increase 
in trade with a minimum expenditure of convert-
ible currency. 
Another task will be to adapt the productive 
apparatus of Latin America to the changes taking 
place in the industrialized centres. If the region 
wishes to improve the integration of its pro-
ductive sectors, fill the gaps in its industrial struc-
ture and involve itself in world technological pro-
gress, all the countries will have to join in a com-
mon effort. 
The Quito Plan of Action defines sufficiently 
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clearly some of the tasks which have to be tackled 
in the immediate future. A large part of this 
responsibility was assumed by the Latin Amer-
ican Integrations Association at its second Coun-
cil of Foreign Ministers. The Latin American 
economic system covers a large part of the region 
and, given co-operation, can contribute to unity 
and a greater Latin American presence in in-
ternational negotiations. The Andean Group, 
which has played a pioneering role in defining 
the concept of integration —by adding the poli-
tical and programme dimension— is a rich 
source of experience in this area, as are the Cen-
tral American Common Market and the Carib-
bean Community with their achievements in the 
derestriction of trade and development of co-
operation in many different sectors. 
The integration systems have been under 
serious pressure as a result of the slowdown in 
the indutrialization process and the Latin Amer-
ican crisis. Nevertheless, their institutions have 
remained largely intact and ready to operate in 
the new stage which the region is entering. 
3. Co-operation and integration 
Economic and technical co-operation has always 
existed in Latin America and it has grown con-
siderably stronger in recent decades. This pro-
cess has been facilitated by the integration move-
ments which broke down the isolation in which 
each country lived. Co-operation differs from 
integrat ion in its instruments and legal 
framework, but this difference amounts to little 
in practice. The integration systems include 
areas of co-operation which go beyond the limits 
of mutual open markets. The results of this co-
operation tend to foster the subsequent integra-
tion of economies, although many of these mea-
sures operate at the margin of the integra-
tion systems. Both sets of measures should be 
strengthened on a mutual basis. 
Many of the areas of co-operation included 
in the integration systems have maintained a de-
gree of coherence and dynamism even in dif-
ficult times. Mention must be made of the elec-
tric power link-up in the Central American Com-
mon Market, which continues to advance despite 
the considerable tensions in the area. In the An-
dean Group the Hipólito Unanue, Simón Rodrí-
guez and Andrés Bello agreements continue to 
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function and, working together with the Andean 
Parliament and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 
they are surmounting the economic dimension 
and aiming at the establishment of a genuine 
community of countries. 
A number of moves have also been made in 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to give this 
group greater cohesion. The Organization of 
Eas t e rn Car ibbean States was recently es-
tablished among the less-developed countries 
and it already has joint bodies such as a Central 
Bank and a Supreme Court of Justice as well as 
joint diplomatic representation. Because of its 
particular geographical configuration, CARICOM 
committed itself from the outset to establishing 
regional maritime and air transport companies. 
T h e Latin American Free Trade Associa-
tion/Latin American Integration Association has 
organized special programmes of support for the 
relatively less-developed countries in which it has 
called for the co-operation of the other member 
countries. Unfortunately, these programmes 
proved of little use to the recipient countries, not 
only because they were furnished with few re-
sources but also because they were not organical-
ly incorporated in the main areas of action of these 
institutions. 
With the establishment of SELA in 1975 the 
countries attempted to open up a new channel 
for their aspirations for regional co-operation 
and to meet the need for co-ordination of policies 
towards the rest of the world. The system proved 
fairly effective with regard to the second objec-
tive, but less effective with respect to Latin Amer-
ican co-operation. The action committees —the 
mechanism chosen as a means of securing this 
co-operation— were rarely able to perform their 
functions, mainly for lack of commitment on part 
of the member countries. The most important 
committees are the ones for assistance in the 
reconstruction of Guatemala, which has already 
ceased to operate, for marine products and for 
drinking water; mention must also be made of 
the Latin American Technical Information Net-
work and the Regional Food Security System. 
Other important areas of the work of SELA are the 
co-ordination of the Latin American position in 
the international negotiations in UNCTAD, GATT 
and the North-South dialogue, as well as on the 
Malvinas conflict (ECLAC, 1985). 
At the present time, the renegotiation of the 
foreign debt is monopolizing the efforts of the 
Latin American countries to reach agreement 
among themselves, though they have not even 
been able to achieve the desired unity of 
approach. 
This incomplete list gives some idea of the 
large areas in which regional co-operation could 
s t rengthen a productive capacity and trade 
which, in the narrow national environment, 
could prove uneconomic. In the light of the vari-
ety of options available, provision must be made 
for an equally broad range of modalities, forums 
and mechanism of co-operation. 
4. Geopolitical aspects of integration 
There are centripetal forces operating in favour 
of Latin American development and centrifugal 
forces pushing the region towards disunity in its 
policy towards the industrialized centres. The 
natural reluctance of governments to surrender 
any m e a s u r e of f r eedom in d e t e r m i n i n g 
economic policy is being aggravated by the crisis 
and by the need to correct, in whatever way pos-
sible, the external imbalance caused by debt 
servicing. T h e external restrictions occupy the 
attention of governments, so that discussion of 
development is increasingly limited to matters 
connected with the solution of the external prob-
lems. 
In addition to the disunity caused by the 
crisis, there are other factors operating against 
integration: the region's great size and difficult 
geographical features, which create problems of 
communications and in intraregional trade, and 
the economic diversity, hostile attitudes, and 
tendency towards bilateralism. 
Geopolitical tensions and the diversity of 
political régimes have also slowed integration 
and co-operation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The geopolitical tensions not only 
weaken the links between countries but also 
jeopardize the very basis of the national develop-
ment of each nation. 
Of the 21 countries for which information on 
the functional distribution of expenditure by 
the central government is available, eight spend 
more on defence than on health, three spend 
more on defence than on education, and two 
spend more on defence than on health and 
education combined (IMF, 1983). 
In other words, in some countries military 
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expenditure is in open competition with econom-
ic and social development, for government ex-
penditure tends to be Fixed in the short term. 
Furthermore, a large proportion of military ex-
penditures are on purchases of weapons from 
the big powers and further reduce import 
capacities, aggravating the problem of foreign 
debt and creating new links of dependence on 
the central countries. 
From another angle, this preoccupation with 
weaponry impairs the effectiveness of the action 
taken to strengthen the political and economic 
links within the region. The tensions and con-
flicts, usually bilateral, not only affect the rela-
tions between pairs of countries but also tend to 
paralyze the initiatives for regional integration 
and co-operation. 
If integration is conceived as a process in 
which all social agents take an active part, then 
the existence of democratic systems of govern-
ment is a necessary condition for its attainment. 
Similarly, integration can only be said to be tak-
ing place when its benefits are perceived by a 
large part of the population of each member 
country. One of the benefits most easy to 
appreciate is the freedom of movement of per-
sons among the countries of an integrated sys-
tem, a situation difficult to bring about in an 
atmosphere of restriction imposed by non-
democratic governments.5 
How can regional integration and co-
operation contribute to solving these problems? 
A first step would be to extend the concept of 
integration to the political level, for up to now the 
5 T h e European Economic Community, for example, 
grants associate status only to countries with democratic gov-
ernments. 
predominant view has been "commercialise". It 
will also be necessary to stimulate awareness of 
the need to achieve regional unity in order to 
deal with the present situation and future in-
ternational relations, since regional unity 
achieved through integration is the only kind of 
unity which can guarantee the countries genuine 
security while preserving the attributes of true 
sovereignty. 
In addition to devising mechanisms for the 
fair distribution of the benefits of integration, it 
will be necessary to secure active participation in 
this process for all social, political and economic 
groups and thereby increase their democratiza-
tion. 
One means of creating a political environ-
ment favourable to the solution of border dis-
putes by peaceful means might be the conclusion 
of a Latin American treaty which would include: 
a guarantee of the territorial integrity of every 
country in the region and a commitment to non-
aggression; the peaceful solution of disputes; ex-
press rejection of the use of force in the solution 
of conflicts or disputes of any kind; a gradual 
reduction of military expenditures and alloca-
tion of these funds to economic and social de-
velopment; and reaffirmation of democracy and 
ideological pluralism as forms of coexistence and 
government. 
Latin America's integration and co-
operation organs must be given a role in these 
political tasks. For unless the secretariats of the 
subregional integration systems and SELA play a 
part in removing the obstacles to integration, the 
process will not be able to break free of the nar-
row and incomplete framework of "commercial-
ism". The difficulties confronting this undertak-
ing are enormous. 
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